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Abstract 
We suggest CCS risk assessment should extend beyond the primary container to address a wide range of safety, economic, social, 
political and engineering issues. In New Zealand, for example, past experiences of large engineering projects suggests that failure 
to gain public support or to allocate appropriate resources to navigate through legislative process could provide significant 
barriers to successful CCS implementation.  We have developed a modularized and probabilistic based logic tree which 
encompasses the main components of CCS (capture, transport, injection and storage) and is built upon the five issues mentioned 
above. 
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1 Introduction 
Risk assessment is commonly used in many industries to understand better the likelihood and impact of various 
monetary and safety factors. Risk assessment is typically engaged after preconditions for a particular activity or 
project have been satisfied and potential hazards identified. Risk assessment is a decision making tool that aids the 
management of potential adverse events. For projects in which CO2 is being stored in subsurface rock formations the 
leakage of the injected CO2 to the surface (i.e. into the atmosphere or ocean) and near-surface resources (e.g., 
potable ground water aquifers) poses the most widely recognised risk to the success of the project (e.g., Bowden & 
Rigg [1]; Monitor Scientific [2]; Pawar et al. [3]; West et al. [4]). Such leakage has the potential to impact on health, 
safety and the environment (HS & E), to decrease the climatic benefits of CO2 sequestration and to reduce the 
economic viability of storage by, for example, decreasing the carbon credits earned as part of the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) (IPCC [5]; van Egmond [6]). While the risk of leakage of sequestered CO2 into the atmosphere is 
generally expected to be very low (e.g., Bowden and Rigg [1], probabilities 10-4 to 10-6), the consequences of 
leakage could be far reaching, particularly if this occurs before the technology has received widespread stakeholder 
acceptance.  
Risk management strategies, which may include risk assessment, risk reduction (prior to the occurrence of an 
adverse event) and risk mitigation (after the event), are diverse both in their scope and timing of implementation 
(Bowden and Rigg [1]; Stenhouse et al. [7]). The diversity of risk management practices varies according to whether 
assessment is qualitative or quantitative, encapsulates part or all of the sequestration process (i.e., capture, transport, 
injection and/or containment), includes some or all risk factors (i.e. social, economic, engineering and/or 
geological), and the extent to which risk management is conducted before, during or after injection (Fig. 2)(e.g., 
IPCC [5]; IEA [8]). This diversity arises in part because for many storage projects presently under consideration 
favourable political, social and economic conditions are assumed and risk assessment is focussed on CO2
containment. The focus on leakage has lead some to question the utility of risk assessment and to suggest that 
management, through monitoring and mitigation measures is the most effective means of dealing with risk (e.g., 
Espie [9]).  
The drive towards risk mitigation, as opposed to risk reduction via assessment, has been fuelled by the 
recognition that estimates of the probability of an event occurring that results in CO2 migration from a storage 
container can be poorly constrained (van Egmond [6]; Stenhouse, et al. [10],; van der Sluijs et al. [11]). 
Understanding these uncertainties is one of the major challenges presently facing all CO2 sequestration risk 
assessment methods. It is, therefore, not surprising that CO2 sequestration risk assessment is mainly qualitative, 
although more precise methods have been proposed in recent years (e.g., Bowden & Rigg [1]; van Egmond [6]; 
Wildenborg et al. [12]; Walton et al. [13]; Wo et al. [14]; Rigg et al. [15]), where probabilities of occurrence are 
assigned to risk events from models and expert judgment. Whether use of these techniques is justified given the 
variable understanding of the input data is a point of current debate. Irrespective of this debate, pre-injection risk 
assessment represents an important mechanism for guiding stakeholders in their understanding of the potential risks 
and consequences that are faced in a proposed project. Therefore, risk assessment coupled with a risk reduction 
strategy, serves a purpose that is additional to the monitoring based risk management strategy. The precise role of 
risk assessment is, however, likely to vary from site to site and country to country and is dependent on many factors, 
including, geological conditions, public opinion, economics and government policies.  
1. Risk Assessment Methods 
Despite the large body of CCS risk assessment work completed to date (e.g., Bowden and Rigg [1]; Espie [9]; 
Stenhouse et al. [10]; van der Sluijs et al. [11]; Vendrig et al. [16]; Savage et al. [17]; Benbow et al. [18]; Benson 
[19]; Akimoto et al. [20]; Bohm et al. [21]; Wildenborg [22]; CO2CRC [23]) we believe that a comprehensive 
methodology for carbon, capture & storage (CCS) risk assessment does not yet exist and needs to be developed. 
Existing risk models for CCS sites generally fall into three main categories: i) performance analysis that produces a 
model of the reservoir behavior (Maul et al. [24]); ii) a systems approach where various parts of the system are 
targeted individually (Stenhouse et al., [10]; and iii) systems analysis in which all or many aspects of the 
sequestration system (e.g., capture, transport, injection and containment) are considered collectively; this approach 
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remains in development (Pawar, et al. [3]; Zhang, et al. [25]). It is desirable for risk assessment to encompass all key 
risk factors, to be transparent, understandable, reproducible and strongly tied to the real world. A CCS risk 
methodology would have most utility, particularly in New Zealand, if it included the following attributes (e.g., Fig. 
1): 1) A full range of CCS activities (e.g., capture, transport, injection and containment) and influences (e.g., 
economics, safety, politics, public opinion and technical); 2) Probability of occurrence of important risk events that 
could impact on the successful implementation and completion of a CO2 storage project; 3) ability to trace the 
impact of individual; 4) An understanding of the consequences of sequestration in both dollar terms, safety to 
humans and environment degradation.
An integrated systems approach is advocated here and requires that risks for the entire CCS system and across the 
full spectrum of risk factors are incorporated into the assessment. To assist in the description of the proposed risk 
assessment method risk factors have been modularised within the four components of the carbon capture and storage 
process: Capture, Transport, Injection and Storage (Fig. 2). Within each primary process category risks associated 
with technical (engineering and geology), public, politics (and general policy decisions), safety and economic 
factors will be addressed. These second order categories are presented in a triangular shape from technical at the 
base to economics and safety at the top. In the triangles each factor exerts important influences on all factors above 
it. While unacceptably high risks may occur at any point in the triangle the factors deemed to be of primary 
importance are safety and economics. This importance is reflected in the position of safety and economics at the top 
of the triangle. 
Each step in the sequestration system will potentially affect three metrics that allow us to understand the risk 
posed by sequestration: 1) costs including start-up and ongoing; 2) amount of CO2 emitted to the atmosphere; and 3) 
rate of escape of any CO2 lost. By tracking these through the entire system, we can derive the risk posed by the 
system in the terms that are ultimately desired. Firstly, we wish to know 
the cost per tonne of CO2 avoided and secondly we wish to understand 
the risk to health, safety and the environment (HS & E). A value for 
each metric will be calculated at each critical step in the system. We can 
then calculate an estimate of the total cost for the system, including all 
considered risks (e.g., delay due to consenting and drilling of extra wells 
due to low reservoir injectivity). The HS & E risk will largely be 
determined by both the total amount of CO2 lost and the maximum rate 
of loss at a given point in the system, while risks to climate change and 
loss of carbon credits are dependent on total CO2 lost to the surface.  
2. Logic Tree Method 
To assist in the calculation of risk and the visualisation of how the 
risk factors relate to each other, the risk assessment will be conducted 
using a logic tree methodology (Wildenborg et al. [12]; Reiter [26]). 
The logic tree approach is a widely used means of visualising the 
calculation of risk using a series of nodes and branches. At each node 
the tree branches two or more times (Fig. 3) and each branch represents 
a possible alternative occurrence or option within the system and is 
assigned a probability of being correct. If the logic tree is thought of as 
modelling risk through the system from start to finish (i.e. left to right), 
then one can consider any possible path through the tree. Each of these 
paths will have a unique probability of occurrence based on the 
probabilities of all its branches. With the hundreds, or potentially 
thousands, of paths possible through the tree, exploring the possible 
outcomes is best accomplished with Monte Carlo simulations (e.g., 
Wildenborg et al. [12]; Reiter [26]). 
Figure 1. Work flow for risk management during the selection of a potential CCS storage system.  
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Figure 2. Schematic diagram outlining the conceptual 
framework for the proposed risk assessment methodology. 
The branches in the logic tree are made up 
of two types: decisions and uncertainties. In 
Fig. 3 all branches are uncertainty branches. 
Decisions are options that may be selected 
when designing the sequestration system and 
include such things as the mode of CO2
transport, type of reservoir, and how the CO2 is 
separated at the source. Uncertainties are 
variations applied to aspects of the system that 
have more than one possible outcome and arise from varied levels of scientific understanding (e.g., different models 
of containment volume or probabilities of earthquake shaking) or possibly from situations that may be beyond 
control of the system designers (e.g., delay due to difficulty in obtaining consent for installing pipeline through 
private property). Combining decision and uncertainty branches in the tree permits key decisions to be identified 
that impact on the risk.  
The logic tree presented in Fig. 3 is a sub-sample of the larger tree in Gerstenberger et al. [27]. Primary risks that 
may negatively impact on the uptake of CCS in the initial stages can be divided into four broad categories; Capacity, 
Public Support, Economics and Operational framework. In constructing the logic tree example presented in Fig. 3 
we assume that these events have been resolved or the risk is acceptable. This approach simplifies the logic tree and 
focuses risk assessment on the implementation process. 
3. Probability Estimates and Expert Elicitation 
Because of uncertainty in the precise meaning of qualitative and quantitative we have largely avoided these 
terms, and instead focus on the precision of the analysis which we define as the level of detail used to describe the 
system. The precision in modeling of system behaviour is managed differently in almost all CCS risk assessment 
methods with philosophies ranging from less precise methods using descriptive terms combined with fewer system 
components, to more complicated methods that require the assignment of probability distributions to describe the 
behaviour of multiple components within a system (e.g., Fig. 2).  
Determining the risks to key components of the CCS system (e.g. capacity, injectivity and containment) will 
require that probability distributions for multiple parameters are incorporated in the calculations. Figure 4 
schematically illustrates the probability distributions that may be used to estimate the risk to containment and, 
ultimately, to decide whether containment is likely to be achieved. The value of each parameter will be randomly 
selected from the distributions in Monte Carlo simulations. The resulting calculations will consider the impact and 
frequency of all risks, and allow both epistemic (model or knowledge) uncertainties and aleatory (random) 
variabilities (Vivalda [28]) to be incorporated into the calculations. The resulting probability risk assessment model 
will comply with the AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard, although we will adopt a more quantitative 
approach than is commonly used under the standard that is better aligned with engineering practice. The probability 
based approach outlined above provides a means of propagating uncertainty in economic, technological, 
environmental and social risks through the model in a transparent and defensible manner from capture to long-term 
storage. 
In a complex system it is impractical to avoid subjective input into a risk assessment model. This statement is 
particularly true for CO2 sequestration as this is a new and rapidly developing field in which much of the science is 
developmental and lags behind the requirements of risk assessment. When a parameter is poorly understood, in 
some cases it may be possible to encapsulate uncertainty using the judgement of specialised expert panels. Expert 
panels can be an effective tool for describing complex systems for which we have variable understanding. The 
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subjectivity of the panel allows quantitative output from operational models to be combined with additional 
knowledge that may come from a multitude of sources.  
We propose that an expert panel be employed at multiple stages of the risk assessment process to assist in the 
following tasks; 1) identify the risk factors, 2) identify supplementary and novel research required to understand 
better the risk factors and their uncertainty, and 3) assign probabilities (and their distributions) to risk factors. Used 
in this manner the expert panel would be engaged at several points in the risk assessment process, which may 
increase the likelihood of deriving robust estimates of event probabilities. The utility of probabilities provided by 
expert panels may be further improved by ensuring that expert panels contain multiple experts in fields where the 
perceived risks are high and/or opinion is diverse. The systems approach adopted here may require that such panels 
include experts for different parts of the sequestration process (e.g., capture, transport, injection and containment) or 
different disciplines (engineering, geological, economic and social).  
4. Discussion
After the logic tree is fully populated and probabilities have been assigned by the expert elicitation process, the 
risk assessment will be performed by running multiple simulations as described above. The results of the logic tree 
will be presented in the following form: 
• Cost in dollars per tonne of CO2 avoided; 
• Risk to HS&E in terms of CO2 flow rate to the surface or near-surface environment. 
We envision use of the risk assessment for two types of analysis. In the first analysis the stakeholders can 
investigate individual assumptions or choices within the sequestration system and assess their effect on the risk. A 
simple example would be to understand the effects on economics and HS&E of transporting captured CO2 from 
source to reservoir via sea as compared to transporting the CO2 by road. To obtain these results one would compare 
the distribution of risk for all branches that pass through sea transportation versus the distribution for all branches 
that pass though road transportation. 
Figure 3. Logic tree for CO2 reservoir containment analysis. Each branch will be assigned a probability of yes or no based on research, modelling, 
and expert elicitation. 
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The second type of analysis would aim to promote a better understanding of the overall risk of sequestering CO2
at a particular site, perhaps after the system has been optimised by iteratively addressing choices with the first 
analysis. This would involve, for example, examining the calculated distribution of possible costs in dollars per 
tonne of CO2 avoided. The costs may be presented as a mean expected cost with one standard deviation bounds on 
this expected cost.  
As with any risk assessment, it will ultimately be the challenge of the stakeholders to determine ‘what is an 
acceptable risk?’, and to compare this acceptable risk to the outcome of the risk assessment. As different 
stakeholders may have varying opinions about what is acceptable risk, achieving a consensus view may require 
protracted discussion and, in some cases, negotiation. In the development of the methodology we have endeavoured 
to exclude any assumptions about acceptable risk. The proposed method aims to provide a means for the 
stakeholders to develop an understanding of the risk posed by CCS which can be used as a decision making tool for 
the implementation of sequestration. 
Figure 4. Schematic diagram showing a model for storage of CO2 that can be used to estimate the containment risk at individual sequestration 
sites. Shown are the dominant components with probability distributions that must be derived in order to estimate the risk.  
It should be made clear that no risk assessment can guarantee absolute safety (van der Sluijs [11]). The 
sequestration system is complex and contains multiple aspects that involve understanding that is currently at the 
leading edge of scientific research. Such knowledge and research provides a guide to our current best understanding 
of the risks and how they may eventuate. As with any similar process, gaining more knowledge about the system 
will enable us to reduce the uncertainties involved and may also eventually reduce the risks. 
5. Conclusions 
Risk assessment for carbon, capture and storage projects should extend beyond the primary container and address 
a wide range of economic, social, political and engineering issues. We propose a risk assessment methodology that 
assigns probabilities for technical (i.e. engineering and geological), social, policy, safety and economic risk factors 
for each of the four main components of the CCS process (i.e., capture, transport, injection and storage). The 
proposed risk assessment method uses a logic tree approach coupled with the cost of CO2 avoided and the Health, 
Safety & Environment costs. The logic tree is divided into four parts which correspond to the main components of 
the CO2 sequestration process. Each of these four main parts in turn comprises five sub-parts defined by technical, 
social, policy, safety and economic issues. This modularised approach permits related events to be linked and their 
probabilities to be transmitted through the risk assessment process, while allowing the risk assessment to be broken 
down into manageable parts. The method does not reduce uncertainties in the likelihood of risks, but helps to 
highlight risk factors that may have unacceptably high uncertainties and/or a significant detrimental impact on 
successful sequestration. This information should be an important part of an iterative risk assessment process that 
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includes risk reduction (before the event) and mitigation (after the event) measures, coupled with reduction of risk-
factor uncertainties. 
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